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ALBERT BLU MBERG, Note and Legislation Editor
ROBERT J. CALLAGHAN, Case Editor
PAUL MALONEY, Book Reziew Editor
HENRY GREEN VALD, Business Malnager
The resignation of Saul Finestone, an Associate Editor, has been accepted.
NOTES
SOME ASPECTS OF "IM1PUTED" NEGLIGENCE-If Lord Herschell optimisti-
cally assumed that, Siegfried-like, he had forever despatched the dragon of "iden-
tification", by his decision in the case of M'fills v. Armstrong,' he reckoned either
without the durability of that monstrosity, or without the fact that it was hydra-
headed. The recent decisions in the cases of Zidema v. Bekkering,2 and of
Langford Motor Co. v. McClung Construction Co.,3 which imputed the contribu-
tory negligence of a husband to his wife 4 and of a bailee to his bailor, respectively,
so as to bar recovery by the innocent plaintiff in each case, make it imperative to
reopen this oft-litigated question, in order to examine both the history and the
rational foundations of what one court called "an obsolete and exploded legal
heresy." 5 The subtle refinements of legal reasoning, to which some courts have
resorted, in order to justify one of the greatest anomalies of the law, have re-
sulted in a welter and chaos which are the despair of students. Indeed, in at-
tempting to clarify the subject, one experiences at the outset the hopelessness of
the Carpenter in Alice:
"'If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose,' the Walrus said,
'That they could get it clear?'
'I doubt it,' said the Carpenter,
And shed a bitter tear."
That the doctrine is obsolete is attested by the fact that the vast majority of
courts have repudiated it, if they ever adhered to it at all; it is a source of wonder
that it should still be the law in any enlightened jurisdiction.
At the outset, it may be best to define our terms. What is "imputed" negli-
gence? It exists
'The Bernina, 13 App. Cas. i (i888).
2239 N. W. 333 (Mich. 1931).
146 S. W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). For an interesting discussion of the
bailor-bailee relationship, see Note (1930) 78 U. OF P.,,. L. REV. 1009.
'The decision does not make it clear whether the court relied on the relationship of
husband and wife, or of operator and passenger or guest, as the basis for the imputation
of negligence.
5Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., i8o Cal. 32 at 36, i79 Pac. -o3 at m04 (igig).
(1123)
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cc... when the plaintiff, although not chargeable with personal negli-
gence, has been, by the negligence of a person in privity with him, and with
whose fault he is chargeable. exposed to the injury which he received through
the negligence of the defendant." 6
The term is of proper application in only one situation, that of a suit by an inno-
cent plaintiff (i. e.. one who has concededly not been guilty of any personal negli-
gence, and who has not voluntarily assumed any risk) 7 against a negligent de-
fendant, who is seeking to charge plaintiff with the contributory negligence of a
third person, in an effort to debar him from recovery. It is perhaps best epito-
mized by Professor Bohlen's phrase. "contributory negligence of persons other
than the plaintiff". When is a person in such privity with another that such
other's contributory negligence may be "deemed" that of the plaintiff? The
tradition of the common law permits of but one answer to this question: no one
should be responsible for the misconduct of another, for purposes either of being
liable for injuries caused to a third person by such other's misconduct, or for
purposes of being debarred from recovery for injuries sustained by himself, as a
result of the concurrent negligence of such other and the defendant, unless there
existed between them the relation of master and servant, or principal and agent.
so as to imake the plaintiff vicariously responsible, or unlcss the parties wcre
engaged in a common or joint enterprise, with its implications of mutual control
and mutual responsibility. Can there be any other basis for vicarious responsi-
bility? It would seem that all else is judicial legislation, and a dangerous recur-
rence to the semi-barbarous aspects of the doctrine of liability without fault, for
the law to allow one person to be responsible for the misdeeds of another, with
whom he did not sustain one of the above-mentioned relationships, and over whose
actions he maintained no right or ability to control.
To state the problem more concretely, and to illustrate how very great is the
anomaly which only a pluperfect refinement of legal reasoning has foisted upon
the law, it is a platitude to state that no one is liable for the misconduct of another,
toward whom he does not sustain the relation of principal, master, or joint entre-
preneur: the law recognizes no element of vicarious liability where such relation-
ship -is absent." Is it possible, then, that the law recognizes responsibility for
purposes of imputation, in a situation the identical facts of which disclose no
responsibility for purposes of liability? Can there be responsibility for one pur-
pose, but not for another ?-1o It would seem that a study of the cases must yield
an affirmative answer in many instances. It will be the purpose of this note to
inquire into this putative anomaly, with a view to determining whether inconsist-
ency in fact exists, and what the rational basis of such inconsistency may be.
The thesis of the present annotation is that
.. only when the contributory negligence with whch it is sought
to charge a plaintiff is of such a character, and the person guilty of the same
'Smith v. New York Central & H. R. R., 4 App. Div. 493, 38 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1896).
If plaintiff has been guilty of personal negligence, or has voluntarily assumed the risk
of the situation, he is of course precluded from recovery. Both of these topics are beyond
the score of the present note. For a valuable discussion of what constitutes personal neg-
ligence or voluntary assumption of risk, in this connection, see Mechem, The Contributory.
Negligence of Automobile Passengers (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 736.
'Knightstown v. Musgrove, i16 Ind. 121, 18 N. E. 452 (1888); Cahill v. Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 92 Ky. 34.5, 18 S. W. 2 (1891). Of course, a rule of public policy
may extend the ambit of vicarious responsibility; e. g., where work or an instrumentality
is inherently dangerous, one is liable for the acts of even an indepcndent contractor. Ken-
dall v. Johnson, ii Wash. 477, 99 Pac. 310 (1909).
'Laugher v. Pointer, j B. & C. 547 (1876) ; Higgins v. Western Union Tel. Co., 156
N. Y. 75, 50 N. E. 500 (1898).
""'It is a poor rule that won't work both ways'. And that is just the fault of the
rule under discussion." Note (893) 41 Am. L. REG. 763, 765.
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is so connected with such plaintiff, that an action might be maintained against
him for damages for the consequences of such negligence, can it in contem-
plation of law be justly imputed to him." "-
In other words, one is liable for the misconduct of another only when the maxim
qui facit per allure facit per se is applicable. "  By a parity of reasoning, the
maxim must apply before the misconduct of such other should be imputed, so as
to bar recovery. Succeeding sections will point out in what respects some courts
deviate from this fundamental principle, and impute negligence on the basis of
some fortuitous relationship which is in no wise one of the recognized conditions
for the application of the rule of respondeat superior.
I. Operator of a Vehicle and His Passenger or Guest"
The case of Thorogood v. Bryan,14 which enunciated the doctrine of
"identification", fathered the whole "brood of folly without father bred". In
that case, defendant, an omnibus driver, negligently permitted the plaintiff's dece-
dent, a passenger, to alight without stopping the vehicle or drawing up to the
curb. Defendant's omnibus, negligently operated, drove up at that moment,
struck the decedent and inflicted the injuries from which he subsequently died.
It was held that the decedent had, by selecting the particular conveyance, so far
identified himself with the driver that the latter's negligence was his, and that he
was a party to any injury resulting therefrom! The court decided the all-
important question whether the deceased had control over the driver, by deciding
as a matter of law that a passenger in a public conveyance has such control:
"He selects the conveyance. He enters into a contract with the owner,
whom, by his servant the driver, he employs to drive him. If he is dissatis-
fied with the mode of conveyance, he is not obliged to avail himself of it." "
The utter absurdity of defining "control" in such terms is thus expressed by
one writer:
". .. it will hardly be seriously urged that the passenger in a public
conveyance has any power to control the driver or manager thereof. Can a
passenger who wishes to get out at a way station stop an express train at his
pleasure ? or can a person who wishes to go up-town stop a downward bound
car and make it turn around and go back ?" "I
It is in this situation that the manifest inconsistency of attributing the negli-
gence of one person to another for one purpose, but not for all, appears most
strikingly. Ii the reasoning of the court in the Thorogood case were carried to
its logical conclusion, liability would be vicariously imposed upon each passenger,
who would be answerable in damages to every person injured by the carelessness
of the operator of the vehicle in which he happens to be riding! '7 Such a propo-
sition is obviously too absurd to require further mention, since the fundamental
legal precept that no one is liable for the fault of another militates against it.
But it is just as obviously arbitrary to say cx cathcdra that the plaintiff is to be
UMorgan County v. Payne, 27 Ala. 674 at 676, 93 So. 628 at 629 (1922).
"Cahill v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., supra note 8.
'The spurious distinction beEween passengers for hire and social guests, for purposes of
recovery, which seems to have been made only by Wisconsin, has been eliminated by the
Supreme Court of that state, in the case of Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, i8I N. W. 739
(1921), overruling Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878).
"8 C. B. 115 (1849).
'At 131.
"Supra note io, at 764.
'See Bennett v. The New Jersey R. & T. Co., 36 N. J. L. 22-5, 227 (873).
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charged with the negligence of someone else for one purpose, but not for an-
other. 8 The law knows no such distinction, and no court would seriously con-
tend that an innocent fourth person has an action against the present plaintiff,
who is in no way responsible for the misdeeds of the actor.
Considering the superficiality and the speciosity of its justice, it is not sur-
prising that the rule of Thorogood v. Bryan should have died a swift and sudden
death in England, and in almost all of the few states which adopted it in this
country. In the United States. the case of Little v. Hackett 1 blazed the trail
for what is today the overwhelming weight of American authority, by holding as
a matter of law that a passenger or guest is not, without more, the master of the
operator of the vehicle in which he is riding, that there is no ground upon which
to identify them, and that in consequence there can be no imputation of the
driver's neglect to the passenger or guest, qua passenger or guest.
"The truth is, the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan rests upon indefen-
sible ground. The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver
or the owner, without his personal co-operation or encouragement, is a
gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The parties are not in the
same position. The owner of a public conveyance is a carrier, and the driver
or the person managing it is his servant. Neither of them is the servant of
the passenger, and his asserted identity with them is contradicted by the daily
experience of the world." "I
If Little v. Hackett did not succeed in thoroughly discrediting the doctrine
of "identification", the decision in the case of Mills v. Armstrong,"- which over-
ruled Thorogood v. Bryan on its native heath, put the finishing touches to the
process. One by one, jurisdictions which had adopted this fallacious tenet aban-
doned it in favor of the more enlightened rule that there can be no imputation for
purposes of barring a recovery where there can be none for purposes of liability.22
Michigan alone clings tenaciously to the outworn distinction,23 and lacks the
courage to overrule it, although its courts seek to circumvent what they acknowl-
edge to be a legal bite naire upon the slightest pretext.
-2 4
Needless to say, if there exists between the driver and his passenger or guest
the genuine relation of master and servant, or of principal and agent, or if the
facts disclose that they are engaged in a joint enterprise, so that the maxim qui
facit per alium facit per se is applicable, the negligence of the former is, and
I" Ibid.
39 116 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (i886).
" At 375, 6 Sup. Ct. at 395. Accord: Bennett v. The New Jersey R. & T. Co., supra
note 17.
'Supra note i.
'Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 At. 31 (i89o) ; Reiter v. Grober, supra note 13.
"Mullen v. City of Owosso, ioo Mich. io3, 58 N. W. 663 (894); Kneesbaw v. De-
troit United Ry., 169 Mich. 697, 135 N. W. 903 (1912) ; Granger v. Farrant, i79 Mich. 19,
146 N. W. 218 (1914) ; Jewell v. Rogers, 208 Mich. 318, 175 N. W. i5i (i919) ; Geeck v.
Luckenbill, 215 Mich. 288, 283 N. V. 729 (192i); Gates v. Landon, 216 Mich. 417, 185 N.
W. 723 (192i) ; Wilson v. Coe Township, 233 Mich. 75, 206 N. AN". 355 (19 25) ; Steinberg
v. Builders Lumber Co., 238 M'ich. i81, 212 N. W. 96o (1927) ; Brady v. Pjre Marquette
Ry., 248 Mich. 406, 227 N. W. 737 (I929)
Thus, in Donlin v. Detroit United Ry., i98 Mich. 327, 164 N. V. 447 (1917), the
court allowed plaintiff to recover, on the ground that being a minor, he was incapable of
entering into a contract of agency. In order to bar him from a recovery, said the court,
it must be shown that plaintiff was a member of a joint enterprise. Qucrre: If plaintiff
lacked the capacity to employ an agent, how could he have the capacity to enter into a joint
enterprise, which is merely another phase of the doctrine of vicarious responsibility? Ac-
cord: Hampel v. Detroit, etc. R. R., 138 Mich. i, ico N. W. oo2 (i9o4).
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should be, imputed to the latter, whether for the purpose of barring a recovery
by him, or of holding him liable to a third person injured thereby."5
11. Suits Between Johit Entrepreneurs 2
6
Conceding that a participant in a joint enterprise is, and should be, respon-
sible for the misconduct of those engaged with him in the common scheme, for
the purposes both of being liable to a third person injured by such misconduct,
and of being barred from recovery against a person who has been concurrently
negligent, should such participant be precluded, by virtue of his co-membership,
from maintaining a suit inter sese against his negligent fellow-participant? The
answer should be an emphatic negative, 2 but some courts, relying upon what
seems to them to be a parity of reasoning with barring a joint entrepreneur from
recovering against a third person, hold that mere participation in a common enter-
prise is a ground for imputing the negligence of one member to all those engaged
therein, even for the purpose of maintaining a suit against the miscreant member.
Thus, where the plaintiff, defendant and others agreed to take a trip in the defend-
ant's automobile, and to divide the expenses of the trip, the court held that the
plaintiff could not recover for injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's
negligence, on the ground that they were engaged in a joint enterprise, thus refus-
ing to distinguish between cases in which the defendant is a third party, and those
in which he is a joint entrepreneur.
2 8
The analogy upon which this line of reasoning proceeds is entirely a false
one, as a comparison of the two types of cases cannot help but prove. On the one
hand, it shocks one's conscience that a person who, by hypothesis, has control over
another, and is therefore in a sense one with him, should be so highly ungraciotis
as to expect to recover from a third person for the consequences of his own
failure to exercise the right, and the presumed ability, to control, which vested in
him as a member of the common scheme. It is as if he were himself negligent:
the situation delineated is one of the few in which true identification exists. On
the other hand, we have to deal with the legal duty, which is imposed upon every
member of society who is sui juris, so to act as not to injure another by wrong-
ful conduct. In this respect, it cannot make the slightest difference whether the
parties are engaged in a joint enterprise or not: the duty not to injure another
by a wrongful act is common to all. To impute the negligence of one joint entre-
preneur to another, in an action inter sese, so as to bar recovery by the innocent
party, is to permit a wrongdoer to take refuge behind his own wrong.29 It is not
the law that one person is disqualified from suing another, merely by virtue of
some legal relationship subsisting between them. Thus, one partner may sue
another for wrongful conversion of firm property; a principal may maintain an
See in support of the majority rule: Parmenter v. McDougall, 172 Cal. 306, 156
Pac. 460 (1916) ; Thompson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 258 I1. App. 123 (193o) ; Willis v.
Schertz, 1,08 Iowa 712, 175 N. W. 321 (19-"o) ; Kalland v. City of Brainerd, 141 Minn. rig,
169 N. W. 475 (1918); Treadway v. United Rys., 300 Mo. I56, 253 S. W. 1037 (1923);
Mtontague v. Missouri & Kan. Ry., 305 o. 269, 2_64 S. V. 813 (1924); Sinica v. New
York Rys., i9o App. Div. 727, ISo N. Y. Supp. 377 (i92o), reargument denied, ISo N. Y.
Supp. 953 (19-2o); Doyle v. United Electric Rys., 124 Atl. 733 (R. I. 1924).
Space limitations forbid a discussion of what constitutes a joint enterprise, or of the
propriety of imputing the negligence of one joint entrepreneur to another, in suits against
third parties. Both of these extremely interesting and important topics are amply dis-
cussed in Note (1920) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 676; Note (i9) 38 YALE L. J. 81; Note
(1929) 63 A. L. R. 909; (19-9) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. :270. See Rollison. The "Joint En-
terprise" h; the Law of Imputed ,Veglgeuce (193i) 6 NOTRE DA.IE LAWYER 172.
See, passim, Brenner, The Liability of an Owzer of a Vehicle When, Due to His
,Vegligence, His Guest Is Injured (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 288.
' Barnett v. Levy, 213 Ill. App. 129 (i919) ; HuYo, AUTO-MOBILES (7th ed. 1924) § 8i1.
"O'Brien v. W~oldson, 149 \Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304 (1928).
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action against an agent for breach of duty or disloyalty; a ccstui que trust may
recover from a trustee for breach of trust.3" It would indeed be a strange situa-
tion if the law should constitute a person caput hipinum , for no other reason than
that he has seen fit to associate himself with others in mutual business or other
dealings.
The majority of courts refuse to countenance what is obviously a false
analogy,31 based upon the parti pris that when one person engages in mutual
dealings with another, he surrenders all his legal rights to such other. Thus,
where the plaintiff and defendant, among others, made up a party to go hunting in
defendant's automobile, and the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's
negligence in driving, the court, in allowing recovery, said:
"A joint enterprise . . . is not for the purpose of permitting one of
the parties thereto to commit a tort upon his associates. Suppose this hunting
party had reached its destination and a member of the party had carelessly
shot one of his associates. Would the fact that they, to some extent, were
engaged in a common enterprise render the defendant sued for the shooting
immune - I think not." 32
III. Husband and Wife
(A). Suit by One Spouse for Personal Injury Sustained as a Result of the
Concurrent Negligence of the Other and the Defendant
Should the contributory negligence of one spouse be imputed to the other,
who has suffered personal injury? Upon principle, it is difficult to find any
meritorious reason why the mere fact of marital relationship should give rise to
such imputation. Of course, in this situation, as in every other, there may subsist
between husband and wife the true relation of master-servant, principal-agent, or
co-participation in a joint enterprise.23 But we are concerned in this annotation
with cases in which courts will impute negligence even in the absence of one of
these essentials, and purely on the basis of some relationship which for this pur-
pose is both fortuitous and extra-legal. Husband and wife are today separate
legal entities: the husband is no longer liable for the torts of his wife,3 4 and the
great majority of courts are therefore consistent in holding that her negligence
may not be imputed to him.31 The converse is of course also true. If mere family
Haller v. Willamowicz, 23 Ark. 566 (16i) (partnership); Newby v. Harrell, 99
N. C. 149, S S. E. 284 (888) (partnership) ; Thomas v. Newcomb, 26 Ariz. 47, 221 Pac.
226 (1923) (principal-agent); Hall v. M. B. O'Reilly Realty Co., 3o6 MO. 182, 267 S. XV.
407 (1924) (trustee-beneficiary).
'Bushnell v. Bushnell, 1o3 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Harber v. Graham, lO5
N. J. L. 213, 143 Atl. 340 (I928) ; Wilmes v. Fournier, iii Misc. 9, i8o N. Y. Supp. 860
(1920), aff'd, 185 N. Y. Supp. 958 (i92i); O'Brien v. Woldson, supra note -; Collins
v. Anderson, 37 Wyo. 275, 2_6o Pac. 1O89 (1927).
'Wilmes v. Fournier, supra note 31, at 12, i8o N. Y. Supp. at 862.
'E. g., in Standard Oil Co. v. Thompson, i89 Ky. 81o, 22-,6 S. W. 368 (3920), plain-
tiff, who was an invalid, was injured while riding in an automobile negligently operated by
his wife. In denying recovery against the negligent defendant, the court properly based
its decision upon the agency relationship.
I ScHouiLER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) §§ 122 ff.; I SHEAR-MAN AND RED-
FIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) §67.
' Stilson v. Ellis et ux., _208 Iowa 1157, 22-.5 N. W. 346 (1929) ; Beeson v. Perry, 123
Kan. 164, 253 Pac. 1097 (1927) ; Cox's Adm'rs. v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry., 238 Ky. 312, 37
S. W. (2d) 859 (193) ; Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., i66 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928) ; Ko-
kesh -v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 151 N. W. 715 (917) ; Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, 174
Minn. 450, 219 N. W. 774 (1928) ; Laird v. Berthelote, 63 Mont. 122, -o6 Pac. 445 (922) ;
Stevens v. Luther, io5 Neb. 184, i8o N. W. 87 (192o) ; Simrell et vx. v. Eschenbach, 3o3
Pa. 156, 154 Atl. 369 (1931) ; Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., _2o Pac. 970 (Utah 193o);
Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N. W. 690 (192i).
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relationship, by blood or marriage, were to furnish a legal basis for exempting a
negligent defendant from liability, where should courts draw a line of demarca-
tion? Why should not the negligence of cousins be imputed to each other? Should
the courts resort to genealogies, in order to determine whether the parties were
related? Should blood tests be admissible in evidence, to prove that perhaps the
parties had a common ancestor? The proposition falls by the sheer weight of its
own absurdity, yet a few courts have stultified themselves by arbitrarily setting up
the marital relation as a basis for imputation, as a bar to recovery.36
Two reasons are assigned, in justification of the minority rule: (i) If a
recovery were allowed, the benefit thereof would accrue indirectly to the contribu-
torily negligent husband, who would thus profit by his own wrong. This reason
is entirely invalid, at least in jurisdictions in which the proceeds of the recovery
would be the wife's separate property." If the wife desires to contribute the pro-
ceeds to the family exchequer. it is certainly her right to do so, since they are her
absolute property, and it is not the function of courts of law to supervise or criti-
cize their ultimate disposition. (2) The husband is at common law the agent or
servant of the wife. The folly and falsity of this reasoning becomes apparent
immediately, when one considers that at common law the husband was the master
or principal, and the wife the servant or agent. It has never been the law that the
servant or agent is responsible for the torts of the master, for purposes of either
liability or of imputation. Moreover, whatever their legal relation at the com-
mon law may have been, the wife has been universally emancipated by the Married
Women's Acts,' s and almost the last vestige of her identification with her husband
has disappeared. She is today a distinct, independent legal entity, capable of
suing and being sued, and cognizable as such in courts of law. Cessante ratione
legis, cessat ipsa lex.
In a jurisdiction which has a joint interest statute, which requires that suit
be brought in the name of both husband and wife, and that the proceeds of the
recovery become their joint property,39 there is more reason for denying recovery,
on the ethical ground that the wrongdoer would otherwise be sharing in the fruits
of his wrong. But even here, it is unjust to make an innocent wife suffer, merely
because she has the misfortune to be married to a wrongdoer. This is indeed
punishing a wife for her folly in marrying this man! There is nothing in the law
which requires that the sins of one person be visited upon another, who is in no
way responsible for those sins: the modern spirit rebels at the thought of making
an exception in the case of husband and wife. The injustice of a joint interest
statute is obvious, in cases where one of the joint parties is innocent, and there is
sometimes judicial hesitancy to interpret such a law strictly in order to do what
appears to be justice. Thus, in a suit under a death statute which gives a joint
cause of action to the father and mother of an unmarried minor, the contributory
negligence of the father was held no bar to a recovery by the community of the
father and mother, on the ground that the community as such was a legal entity,
and as such had not been guilty of contributory negligence.4"
The majority view takes the position that the husband and wife are such
completely distinct legal entities, that the wife's suit for personal injury may not
"Wisconsin & Ark. Lumber Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 248 S. W. 2-8 (1923); Hol-
saple v. 'Menominee Co., 232 Mich. 603, 206 N. W. 529 (192-5) ; Steinberg v. Builders Lum-
ber Co.; Brady v. Pare Marquette Ry., both snpra note 23. The Michigan decisions do not
make it clear whether the husband-wife or the driver-passenger relation is the ratio de-
cidendi.
" I SCHOUIER, Op. cit. supra note 34, § 332.
'For the political and legal effects of the Married Vomen's Acts, see i ScHouLx.R
§j 286 if; Gilmore, Imputed Negligence (1921) i Wis. L. REV. 193, 204, 2o5.
'Dunbar v. San Francisco, etc. Rys., 54 Cal. App. 15, 2o Fac. 330 (921).
'tHerrell v. Saint Louis-S. F. Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S. W. (2d) 102 (1929).
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even be joined in the same action with the husband's suit for loss of services, 1
and that a recovery in one right is not res adjudicata in an action on the other.4
(B) Suit by a Husband for Loss of His Contributorily Negligent Wife's
Ser-vices
Suppose the wife is injured, as a result partly of her own contributory negli-
gence, so that her husband is deprived of her society and services, to which he is
entitled as an incident of the marriage relation. If she had brought an action for
damages for her personal injuries, she could concededly not have recovered, since
she was contributorily negligent. Should the innocent husband also be debarred
from recovery, in an action for the loss of her society and services? It would
seem that the husband should be allowed to recover, since he is suing in an entirely
independent right, and has done nothing, qua that right, to put himself under a
disability. As stated above, the right of the husband to compensation for the
loss of his wife's services is so distinct from the right of the wife to damages for
personal injury, that the two may not even be joined in one suit. The former is
a property right, existing in an independent capacity, and one should not be
divested of property rights by the act of another.43 Nevertheless, the court in the
case of Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Honey," with true fin de sicle reasoning, barred
the husband from a recovery, and in doing so, delivered itself of peculiarly naive
language to the effect that the wife was capable of exercising her own faculties;
by letting her go abroad unattended, the husband relied on her ability to xercise
those faculties; ergo, he must take the consequences of impliedly asserting that
she was capable of going abroad alone, and her negligence must be imputed to him!
IV. Parent and Child
(A) Suit by a Parent for Compensation for Services Lost as a Result of the
Injury of a Con tributorily Negligent Minor Child
It is well established that a parent is not liable, qua parent, for the torts of
his minor child, since he has no control over the actions of the child by virtue of
the family relationship alone. It would therefore seem, by analogy, that the con-
tribitory negligence of such child should not be imputable to him, in an action by
him for the loss of the child's services. Here again, two distinct interests are
involved: the child's interest in bodily security, and the parent's interest in the
child's labor, which is a necessary complement to his duty to protect, support, and
educate the child. The leading case of Warren v. Manchester Street Ry.," which
represents the majority view upon the subject, so held, in allowing recovery to the
father.
But not all courts are in accord with the reasoning of the Warren case." The
contrary view may be illustrated by the case of Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 7
"1Brickner v. Kopmeier, 133 Wis. 582, 113 N. W. 414 (907).
4 Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 8o N. W. 944 (899).
4 So held in Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 59 Fed. 423, 425 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1893):
"The plaintiff in the one case can not release or discharge the right of action belonging to
the plaintiff in the other. The payment of damages in the one case has no legal effect
upon the damages to be awarded in the other. The admission or statements of the wife,
not forming part of the "res gestar," are not admissible as evidence against the plaintiff
in the suit by the husband, although they are evidence against the plaintiff in the suit
brought by the wife; and so also the admissions of the husband, though provable against
him, are not admissible in the suit of the wife. In all particulars the right of action accru-
ing to the wife and that accruing to the husband are separate and distinct."
Also see Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 38, at 213 ct seq.
" 63 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894), rcv'g Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., supra note 43.
W 7o N. H. 352, 47 Ati. 735 (1900).
' Contra: Sullivan v. Chadwick, 236 Mass. 130, 127 N. E. 632 (i92o); Bell v. Han-
nibal R. Co. 86 Mo. 599 (i885) ; Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N. Y. 1839) ; Nugent
v. Jangaldi Bldg. & Const. Co., 139 Misc. 821, 249 N. Y. Supp. 315 (931).67 I88 Wis. 376, 206 N. WV. 198 (i92:).
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in which the court was compelled to indulge in some weird ratiocination, in order
to reach an opposite conclusion. When a minor child has been injured, says the
court, the right of action which accrues is divided into two parts: the parent
acquires one part, which is analogous to a partial assignment. An assignee stands
in the shoes of his assignor. Since the whole right of action was tainted with
contributory negligence, the part acquired by the parent must also be, and he may
therefore not recover! Is not this flying in the very face of the well-established
principle that the parent's interest in the child's services is a distinct property
right? An obvious example of the correctness of this statement is furnished by
the rule that the parent's right to the services of a daughter who has been seduced,
is not barred by the fact that the daughter participated in the seduction. If a
vested property right may not be divested by the willful act of another, it is
obvious that it may not be by the mere negligence of such other.
4 s
(B) Suit by a Child for Injuries Sustained as a Result of the Concurrenl
Negligence of Defendant and the Child's Parent or Custodian
It seems to be the general rule that "due care" in the case of a child "is only
such care as the great mass of children of his age, intelligence and experience
ordinarily exercise under the same or similar circumstances." 4' In other words,
the great majority of courts do not hold an infant to the same degree of care
required of an adult. And if the child is of such tender years as not to understand
at all the nature of his actions, almost all courts will hold him incapable of being
negligent or contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. What constitutes such
tender age must of course vary with the circumstances of each case.
Suppose the plaintiff to be an infant of such tender years as not to be sni
juris, and therefore incapable, as a matter of law, of being guilty of either negli-
gence or contributory negligence. It is obviously negligent on the part of the
parents, in such a case, to allow so young a child to stray. If the child is injured
as a result of defendant's negligence, should the contributory negligence of the
parents be attributed to it, in an action by the child itself for damages for the
injuries sustained? Upon the plainest legal and common-sense principles, it
would seem that there should be no imputation in such case: if the.infant is
legally incapable of being negligent or contributorily negligent, it is equally inca-
pable of being chargeable with the negligence of another.50
Nevertheless, the feeling obtains in some quarters that to allow such an infant
to recover would be equivalent, in practical effect, to allowing the contributorily
negligent parent to profit by his own wrong, since the parent would in any case
use the proceeds of the recovery for the maintenance of the child, a duty which
he is already legally bound to perform. But such a feeling is unjustified, since a
court of equity would, upon proper petition, decree that money so recovered be
held in trust for the infant until he reached his majority. Moreover, the child
should not be deprived of his due, merely because the negligent parent will indi-
rectly be money in pocket as a result.
Where recovery is denied, one of two theories is usually advanced: (i) The
theory that
's In support of the majority rule: Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Adams, So Fla. 429, 39 So.
133 (1go5); Ferguson v. Columbus, etc. Ry., 77 Ga. io2 (i886); Mattson v. Minnesota,
etc. Ry., 9.5 Minn. 477, 104 N. XV. 443 (i9o5) ; Union Trac. Co. v. Gaunt, 193 Ind. log,
135 N. E. 486 (1923).
'Quinn v. Ross Motor Co., 157 Wis. 543, 147 N--. V. 100 (1914) ; Chicago City R.
Co. v. Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370, 27 N. E. 899, (1891). 1 S-AR.MAN AND REDFIELD, supra note
34, § 73. Under the "Draconian Doctrine," the age of the person makes no difference. Ryan
v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463. 87 N. W. 644 (901).
' Gulesserian v. 'Madison Rys., 172 Wis. 400, 179 K. NX. 573 (92o) ; Clover Cream-
ery Co. v. Diehl, 183 Ala. 429, 63 So. i96 (i9'3) ; Brennan v. Minnesota, etc. Ry., 130
Minn. 314, 153 N. W. 6i (1915).
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"An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to another, to whom discretion
in the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is kccpcr and
agent for this purpose; and in respect to third persons, his act must be deemed
that of the infant; his neglect the infant's neglect." 5'
The absurdity of applying the rule of respondeat supcrior in such a case is mani-
fest: no court would allow the putative agency to serve its other legitimate func-
tion, i. c., to hold the infant liable to one injured by the parent. There is no
agency, there can be no voluntary relationship, depending for its creation, control,
and dissolution upon the will of its creator, in a case where the alleged creator has,
by legal assumption, no will. (2) The theory that the infant is so identified with
its parent or custodian that the latter's negligence is that of the infant. Thus,
"If a father drives a carriage, in which his infant child is. in such a way
that he incurs an accident which by the exercise of reasonable care he might
have avoided, it would be strange to say that though he himself could not
maintain action, the child could." "_
The court which was so indignant at the prospect of allowing a recovery to one
who was concededly incapable of contributory negligence must indeed have been
uncommonly naive. The deep-seated injustice of imputing the negligence of the
parent to a child of tender years, thus requiring of him the same degree of care
as that required of an adult, has been deservedly anathematized by courts and
writers alike.5 3 But the doctrine of imputation still flourishes in several juris-
dictions.'
4
Fortunately, the majority of courts have repudiated the specious reasoning of
both the above lines of legal thought, and refuse to impute the negligence of a
parent or a custodian to a child, whatever the age of the child, and whether the
parent was present at the time of the accident or not.55 These courts, beginning
with the case of Robinson v. Cone,56 proceed upon the consistent theory that all
that is required of an infant is that he exercise the prudence equal to his capacity.
Thus, a child non sui imis, since it has no capacity, by operation of law, can be
guilty of no personal negligence, and can therefore certainly not be charged with
H artfield v. Roper, supra note 46, at 619.
Vaite v. Northeastern Ry., I El. BI. & E. 719 (Eng. 1858).
" "The rule of imputed negligence, as applied to persons nons sui juris, is an anomaly.
The English law of this point presents an extraordinary illustration. On the one hand,
it is held that the negligence of a person having charge of a child is the negligence of the
child, and imputable to it, when the child comes into a court of justice and asks damages
for an injury negligently inflicted upon it by the defendant. But, per contra, where a donkey
is carelessly run down in the highway . . .the defendant is held liable, and though oysters
are negligently placed in a river-bed, it is an injury redressible at law in damages for a
vessel negligently to disturb them. It appears, therefore, that the child, were he an ass
or an oyster, would secure a protection which is denied him as a human being of tender
years, in such jurisdictions as enforce the English or New York rule in this respect."
BEACH, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1899) § 127.
'Morgan v. Aroostook Valley Ry., 115 Me. 171, 98 At!. 628 (1916) ; Sughrue v. Bay
Street Ry., 23o Mass. 363, i19 N. E. 66o (1918) ; Miller v. Flash Chemical Co., 23o Mass.
419, ii9 N. E. 702 (1918) ; Pastore v. Livingston, 72 Misc. 555, 131 N. Y. Supp. 97
1911).
'Jones v. Strickland, 2O Ala. 138, 77 So. 562 (1917) ; Clark v. Chicago, 174 Ill. App.
145 (i9i2); Terre Haute, etc. Traction Co. v. Stevenson, 73 Ind. App. 294, 126 N. E. 34
(192o) ; Raskin v. Sioux City, 198 Iowa 865, 20o N. W. 333 (1924) ; Gregg v. King County,
8o Wash. 196, 141 Pac. 340 (1914) ; Gulesserian v. Madison Rys., supra note 50; Mullinax
v. Hord, 174 N. C. 607, 94 S. E. 426 (1917).
California, which for many years imputed the negligence of a parent to a child, ex-
pressly overruled its previous holding in Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., supra note 5.
W22 Vt. 213 (1850).
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the negligence of another. A child of rational age, suing in its own name and
right, is chargeable with personal negligence or contributory negligence according
to its lights, and is under no circumstances to be held responsible for the negligence
of its parent or guardian, since this would be exacting from it that degree of care
which is required of an adult. It is not too much to say that this is the only legal
position consonant with common sense and natural justice; any other course
would be incorporating
" into the law of the land, as legal precepts, the sayings that the
sins of fathers are visited upon their children, and that the child's teeth must
be set on edge because the father has eaten sour grapes."
Conclusion
The doctrine of "imputed" negligence is an anomaly. Like many another
"weasel" term and "weasel" doctrine, it has been employed by some courts, fol-
lowing the lead of Thorogood v. Bryan, to introduce a juridical element foreign
to the law, i. e., responsibility for one purpose (imputation), but not for another
(liability). Such an inconsistency is indefensible upon any ground, and merely
serves to stultify a common law which is already suffering from too many inse-
curely founded rules.
To be sure, there are situations in which even a rudimentary sense of natural
justice and of the social contract rebels at allowing a recovery, e. g., in actions
brought by, or in behalf of, contributorily negligent beneficiaries of a decedent
killed partly as a consequence of such contributorily negligence. But the obstacle
is not insurmountable: such situations should be the subjects of legislative enact-
ments, and a start has already been made in the case of statutes which constitute
persons operating automobiles, with the consent or permission of the owner
thereof, the servants or agents of such owner. It lies only within the sovereign
power of the legislative body to change legal relationships: it is not the province
of the courts to declare, as a matter of law, that one person is the agent or servant
of another, or is associated with him in a common or joint enterprise, when upon
the plainest legal principles no such relationship exists.
Finally, the whole problem is desperately in need of immediate restatement.
for the benefit of a confused legal world, and in order to define accurately and
definitively an important class of human rights.
A. R-C.
AMBIT OF DoUBLE LIABILITY OF NATIONAL BANK STOCKHOLDERs-Double
liability statutes for the purpose of protecting depositors in unsuccessful banks
have been widely enacted.' With the recent increase in the number of bank fail-
ures interest has revived in the determination of the individuals subject under
these statutes to personal liability. Allowing for the inevitable statutory and inter-
pretational variations, an excellent delineation of the scope of double liability is
afforded by a consideration of the National Banking Act's provisions 2 and their
application.
"7Neff v. City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, 111 S. W. 1139 (I9O8).
1 Statutes have been enacted by the federal government and all states except Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts. Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Virginia.
For comparative purposes the statutes as amended and now in force are given below
below in full.
"The stockholders of every National Banking association shall be held individually re-
siponsible for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, each to the amount
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The primary class of persons liable, in accordance with this act, are share-
holders,' i. c., real owners of stock, as of the date of failure. They are the per-
sons who stand to profit if the bank is successful; and it is only fair that they,
rather than the depositors, should bear the burden of loss in the event of failure.
Unfortunately for the receivers of national banks there is no rule of thumb
method for the ascertainment of the real owners. This is essentially a factual
question dependent on infinitely varied circumstances. The bank's list of share-
holders, of course, is only for protective purposes, and registration thereon is not
necessary for the acquisition of title to stock.4 Such subterfuges as the nominal
purchase of stock by an irresponsible straw man thus afford the real owner no easy
avenue for escaping liability. National Bank v. Case 5 is an excellent illustration
in point. Case contended that a transfer prior to the bank's failure relieved him
of responsibility. The evidence disclosed that the stock was registered in the
transferee's name but that Case retained a power of attorney for its disposition.
A few minor facts also indicated the dummy character of the alleged transferee.
The court held that the true relation between the parties was that of principal and
agent and that Case as the true owner was subject to assessment.
If the stock has been pledged, the pledgor ordinarily remains the real owner G
subject to liability. A mere default in the payment of the debt does not transfer
title 7 ipso facto to the pledgee. Nor does the registration of the stock on the
bank's list of shareholders in the pledgee's name,s as "pledgee", 9 or in that of an
irresponsible third party,10 conclusively indicate a shift in responsibility. Such
nominal transfers are usually made for protection only. The pledgee must have
sold and repurchased the stock 11 or done other positive acts, such as crediting the
of his stock therein, at the par value thereof in addition to the amount invested in such
stock. The stockholders in any National Banking association who shall have transferred
their shares or registered the transfer thereof within sixty days next before the date of the
failure of such association to meet its obligations, or with knowledge of such impending
failure, shall be liable to the same extent as if they had made no such transfer, to the extent
that the subsequent transferee fails to meet sucb liability; but this provision shall not be
construed to affect in any way any recourse which such shareholders might otherwise have
against those in whose names such shares are registered at the time of such failure." 38
STAT. 273 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. §64 (1929). This section is a partial re-enactment of
i3 STAT. 102 (i864), 12 U. S. C. A. §63 (1929), but includes specific provisions concern-
ing transferors which the former act did not contain.
"Persons holding stock as executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees shall not be
personally subject to any liabilities as stockholders; but the estates and funds in their hands
shall be liable in like manner and to the same extent as the testator, intestate, ward, or
person interested in such trust funds would be, if living and competent to act and hold the
stock in his own name." i STAT. ii8 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. §66 (1929).
3 Ibid.
'2 MORsE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §§ 710-713.
'National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628 (1878). A number of other cases have in-
volved the liability of an undisclosed principal. Davis v. Stevens, 17 Blatchf. 259 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1879); Houghton v. Hubbell, 91 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. ist, 1899); Corken v.
Soper, 53 F. (2d) i9o (C. C. A. 5th, i93I), commented on in Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
583, 584.
' Pufahl v. Fidelity National Bank of Oklahoma City, 40 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. loth.
1930).
- Ibid.
' Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Company, i65 U. S. 6o6. 17 Sup. Ct. 465 (1897) ; cf. Wil-
liamson v. American Bank, 185 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 4th, 1911).
: The purpose of so signing is to escape liability by reason of apparent ownership. See
cases infra notes 52 and 53.
" Anderson v. Philadelphia Warehouse, iiI U. S. 479 (1884).
'First National Bank v. Harris, 27 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). Contra: Robin-
son v. Southern National Bank, 18o U. S. 295, 21 Sup. Ct. 383 (1900).
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pledgor with the value of the stock,12 to effect a transfer of title. In the case of
a gift of stock the donee's assent to ownership is a requisite to his subjection to
liability.' 3 This is so obviously just that the courts have bothered very little with
theoretical considerations. Actually the situation raises the debated problem as
to the time when title to a gift passes. If the decisions are to be logically sup-
ported it must be upon the theory that title does not pass until such assent.,
Assuming this to be the true explanation the donor prior to acceptance would
continue subject to liability. Lack of consent underlies another curious situation
involving national banks. A national bank is not permitted by statute to purchase
directly the stock of another national bank, and such a purchase is absolutely
void.' On the basis of absence of consent by the stockholders the purchasing
bank escapes liability.18 This is well settled in spite of a dictum I- to the effect that
the bank should not be permitted to set up its officers' wrongful acts as a defense.
If, on the contrary, the stock has not been acquired directly but in the regular
course of business, as by taking over the stock on the default of a loan, the bank
is liable Is since such acquisition is not ultra vires and unconsented to. These
principles have been applied 19 to determine the liability of a state bank chartered
under a similar statute. Evidently they are applicable to corporations generally.
The infant purchaser problem also involves incapacity and is somewhat analogous.
Applying the same theory of absence of consent the courts have relieved an infant
of liability "0 and held the transferor to a minor responsible.2 '. Viewed from the
title aspect the national bank situation is not without merit since the bank is totally
incapable of taking any title whatsoever by a direct purchase.2  This is not true
of an infant who can hold title to stock although he retains a power of avoidance.
2 3
If, however, the power is not exercised prior to the bank's failure there seems no
logical reason why he as an owner should not be responsible.2  Whatever the
theoretical difficulties may be, the desire to protect infants has definitely settled
their immunity.
Unless infancy is regarded as an exception the attempts of admittedly real
owners at the time of failure to escape liability have met with uniform disfavor.
Of these the most interesting is the coverture defense. In Christopher v. Nor-
' Ohio Valley National Bank v. Hulitt, 204 U. S. 162, 27 Sup. Ct. 179 (907), aff'g 137
Fed. 461 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o), commented on (19o5) 53 U. OF PA. L. REv. 7o7. But cf. Pufahl
v. Fidelity National Bank, supra note 6. In doubtful cases a question is presented for the
jury. Rankin v. Fidelity Insurance, etc. Co., 189 U. S. 242, 23 Sup. Ct. 553 (903).
'Any evidence of assent is sufficient. Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 290
(1889); Finn v. Brown, i42 U. S. 56, 32 Sup. Ct. 136 (18gi); Kenyon v. Fowler, 155 Fed.
3O7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); cf. Williams v. Vreeland, 250 U. S. 295, 39 Sup. Ct. 438 (1919).
Further, no stock certificate need be issued. Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227,
11 Sup. Ct. 984 (1891).
"For a general discussion and cases see THOR.TO.N, GiFTS AND ADVANCEMENTS (1893)
'228.
"See First National Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange Bank, 92- U. S. 122, 128
(1875).
ia Concord First National Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 19 Sup. Ct. 739 (I899) ; Cali-
iornia Bank v. Kenmed, 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 833 (1897).
' See National Bank v. Case, supra note 5, at 633.
' National Bank v. Case, supra note 5; First National Bank of Charlotte v. National
Exchange Bank, supra note i.
"Haynes v. Kershaw, 22 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
See Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496, 499, 50 Sup. Ct. 176, 177 (930) ; commented
on (1930) 43 HAR,. L. REv. i15o; Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C C. D. Vt. 1896); Aldrich
v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (W. D. N. Y. i9o4).
"'Ibid.
4 T~orpso, CORPOR.rTONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 2490-2493.
nLox, DoMESic R.rLATroNs (1905) § 193.
€ i ScaourL.R, DONIESTic R-ATioNs (5th ed. 1895) §417; see Early v. Richardson,
supra note 20, at 499, 5o Sup. Ct. at 177. The court in this case suggests that it will exer-
cise the power of avoidance and attach a retroactive effect thereto.
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vel 25 a married woman held title to stock but contended that she was not liable
because in Florida, where she was domiciled, her contracts were void. The case
raises squarely the question of the nature of the liability. Some support 26 is
given to the theory that it is contractual and dependent on an implied obligation
arising from the acquisition of title to stock. This is a patent fiction. The court
discarded it and held that the statute operated directly upon the real owner so that
the married woman was liable. Applying this theory, which is now generally
accepted as correct2 7 the other attempts to evade liability must clearly fail. The
defense that fraud on the part of the bank induced the purchase of stock is a valid
ground for the rescission of the contract but until avoidance the purchaser is a
real owner upon whom the statute operates .21 Similarly. wrongful issuance of
stock by officers of a national bank does not relieve a purchaser.' The statutory
restrictions upon issuance do not render void but merely voidable an issuance
contrary thereto, and the reasoning adopted in the fraud cases is applicable. A
reconciliation of these holdings with those exempting a national bank from lia-
bility on a direct purchase is possible by distinguishing between two types of ultra
vires acts-voidable and void.-"
Trustees, executors, and other fiduciaries, while holding legal title to stock,
are expressly exempted 31 from personal liability for obvious reasons. In their
stead the trust estate is responsible to the extent of the funds therein. - It is, of
course, essential that the trust estate contain an equitable interest in the stock at
the time of failure.-3 Thus where the evidence showed 11 that an executor prior
to the bank's failure had transferred ihe bank stock to himself as trustee for a
' Cristopher v. Norvell, 2O U. S. 216, 26 Sup. Ct. 502 (19o6) ; cf. Keyser v. Hitz, 133
U. S. 138, io Sup. Ct. 290 (1890).
- See 'Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 523, 525, 20 Sup. Ct. 419, 421 (19oo) ; Rankin v. Mil-
ler, 207 Fed. 602. 611 (D. Del. 1913). The contractual nature of the liability is discussed in
(1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 446.
Cristopher v. Norvell, supra note 25; Concord First National Bank v. Hawkins,
supra note 16.
' Scott v. Deweese, i8I U. S. 202. 21 Sup. Ct. 585 (19Ol) ; Langtry v. Wallace, 182
U. 1. 536, 21 Sup. Ct. 878 (9o) ; Salter v. Williams, 2i9 Fed. 1017 (D. N. J. 1914); Page
v. Jones, 7 F. (2d) 541 (C. C..A. 8th, 1925) ; Anderson v. Cronkleton, 32 F. (2d) 170 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929).
'Aspinwall v. Butler, 133 U. S. 595, 10 Sup. Ct. 417 (189o) ; Scott v. Deweese, supra
note 28; Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, supra note 13. A detailed discussion of this prob-
lem suggests a distinction between void and voidable issues dependent on the degree of wrong-
fulness. See Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 781.
" See cases supra note i6. These cases were so distinguished in Scott v. Deweese, supra
note 28, at 216, 21 Sup. Ct. at 590.
a' S, pra note 2. The lack of trust funds or their derivation from the trustee do not shift
responsibility. Fowler v. Gowing, 165 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908) ; cf. McNair v. Darragh,
31 F. (2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). An interesting problem is presented as to whether a
trustee who knowing of a possible assessment should be liable in tort on the principle of
devastavil if he thereafter distributes the estate. The case of Rankin v. Miller, 2o7 Fed. 6o2
(D. C. Del. 1913), adversely criticised in Note (1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 369, so held, but
was finally decided adversely to the receiver on other issues involving the Statute of Limita-
tions in 269 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920).
" Supra note 2. Wickham v. Hull, 6o Fed. 326 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 3894); Baker v.
Beach, 83 Fed. 836 (C. C. Wash. 1898).
' This is not strictly true in the case of decedent's estates. If stock is owned by the de-
cedent at the time of bank failure the estate is liable as for.his other debts. Richmond v Irons,
121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887) ; cf. Matteson v. Dent, sufra note 26. The ability to
trace trust funds if the estate is distributed is dependent on state law. Witter v. Sowles, 32
Fed. 130 (C. C. D. \t. 1887) ; Luce v. Thomson, 32 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
SWilliams v. Cobb, 242 U. S. 307, 37 Sup. Ct. 115 (1916). Similar facts are presented
in Blackmore v. Woodward, 71 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895). Other cases dealing with
same problem with varied factual situations: Witter v. Sowles, supra note 33; Tourtelot v.
Finke, 87 Fed. 840 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1898) ; Collins v. Caldwell, 29 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A.
5th, 1928).
NOTES
particular trust the general funds of the decedent's estate were not subject to
assessment.
A real or beneficial interest in bank stock at the time of failure is not the sole
basis of liability. In order to effectually protect the depositors, evasions of lia-
bility by out and out transfers to irresponsible parties just prior to a failure had
to be prevented. The National Banking Act of 1864 '" contained no express pro-
visions concerning transferors. The courts filled the gap and held transfers
made with reasonable grounds " for a belief in the bank's impending failure were
fraudulent as to the depositors. The receiver was thus enabled not only to look
to the real owner but also treat the transfer as avoided and hold the transferor
responsible. 37  The transferee's insolvency, 3 the bank's insolvency at the time of
transfer,3 or the transferor's knowledge of depleted reserves 4" were relevant
only as evidence to establish the fraud."t An important limitation was then placed
on the extent of the liability. The transferor was he!d responsib!e only to the
creditors of the bank at the time of transfer.4- The fraudulent transferor could
also apparently escape liability by clearly proving that the assessment could be
obtained by an action against the transferee. 43  With the law in this stage of
development an amendment 41 was passed in 1913 dealing with transferors. Two
definite changes are made. If the transfer or registration of transfer have been
effected within sixty days of failure the transferor is made automatically liable.
4"
This avoids a vast amount of litigation; and, since the transferors were undoubt-
edly participating as stockholders at the time the losses were accruing, works -no
grave injustice. The other effect of the statute is to abolish the limitations on
liability. The statute -1 provides that transferors shall be liabe-"to the extent
that the subsequent transferee fails to meet such liability." They are, as a recent
case .7 held, thus in the position of absolute guarantors.
The final class of persons subject to liability are the so-called apparent owners.
It will be recalled that a real owner's name may never be registered on the bank's
list of shareholders. As a result it is possible for a person who is not the real
owner to appear as such upon the bank's books. Provided this appearance of
ownership is due to a deliberate or careless act or omission of the apparent owner
he is treated as a shareholder and responsible along with the real owner. 8 The
courts admit that the strict provisions of the statute do not cover the situation but
base their holdings on an estoppel." Since no reliance by the bank's creditors or
' Supra note 2.
Cox v. Montague, 78 Fed. 845 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897).
'Sykes v. Holloway, 8i Fed. 432 (C. C. D. Ky. 1897) ; McDonald v. Dewey, 202 U. S.
510, 26 Sup. Ct. 73i (i9o6).
'Sykes v. Holloway, supra note 37; Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251, 2 Sup. Ct. 246
kI882) ; Earle v. Carson, I88 U. S. 42, 23 Sup. Ct. 254 (902) ; McDonald v. Dewey, supra
note 37. But see Stuart v. Haydn, 169 U. S. I, 9, I8 Sup. Ct. 274, 276 (x898).
'Earle v. Carson, supra. note 38; Fowler v. Rouse. 175 Fed. 646 (C. C. A. 2d, i9go);
Vandagrift v. Rich Hill Bank, r63 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908).
"' Earle v. Carson, supra note 38.
"Infancy should apparently be included in this category, but a transferrer to an infant
is liable regardless of fraud. See cases supra note 20.
' McDonald v. Dewey, supra note 37. There was a vigorous dissenting opinion by jus-
tices W~hite, McKenna, and Day, ibid. at 530, 26 Sup. Ct. at 737.
Ibid. at 527, 26 Sup. Ct. at 736.
Supra note 2.
Karraker v. Ernest, 4 F. (2d) 404 (E. D. Ill. 1925) ; Farrel v. Fletcher, 14 F. (2d)
2o4 (D. M[ass. 1926).
' Supra note 2.
' Karraker v. Ernest, supra note 45.
,s Whitney v. Butler, uS U. S. 655, 7 Sup. Ct. 47 (1886) ; Snyder v. Foster, 73 Fed. 136
(C. C. A. 5th, i896).
" See National Bank v. Case, supra note 5, at 631.
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resultant loss need be proved "0 the theoretical justification is clearly weak. It is
evidently a practical measure directed at preventing fraudulent attempts to evade
liability subsequent to the bank's failure. The burden imposed on the apparent
owner is in the nature of a penalty for carelessness. Overlooking the possibility
of the punishment being greatly disproportionate, the courts have broadly applied
the rule. Even the trustee's exemption provision has been held inapplicable.5' To
relieve himself of liability a trustee must, like any other individual, avoid a repre-
sentation of ownership. This is accomplished by a clear indication of his trust
capacity on the bank's books. A pledgee confronted with the desire to register
stock in his own name for protection must follow the same procedure. Ordi-
narily they should sign as "trustee" 12 or "pledgee" , 3 although in one extreme
case 54 a signature as "cashier" was held sufficient. In accordance with the gen-
eral principle of non-representation it is also true that a person who uses reason-
able care to have his name removed from the bank's list is not liable.5 Reason-
able care is primarily a factual question. In general it is required that a trans-
feror bring home notice to the bank of the change in ownership. He cannot
depend on the transferee doing this unless the latter happens to be an officer of
the bank. 6 Once having given notice, however, the transferor is not required
to check up on the bank and see that the transfer is actually made."
Even with these limitations this extension of liability is the one most likely
to be challenged. The subjection of real owners and transferors within the limits
described could only be attacked by objecting to the soundness of the general prin-
ciple of double liability. This has rarely been disputed."3  The apparent owner-
ship doctrine presents greater difficulties. Its practical necessity for the preven-
tion of fraud, particularly in view of the possible hardship, is open to question.
Yet even admitting the desirability of some such measure the present principle
seems unduly broad. Under the doctrine as enunciated the receiver is given an
option and may look to either the real or apparent owner. There is nothing to
prevent his recoupment from the latter although the real owner is perfectly capable
of paying. 59 This seems unfair and could readily be avoided by requiring the
receiver to prove a loss as a condition precedent to recovery. Such a modification
wQuld also be in harmony with the theory of estoppel asserted to underlie the
decisions.
E. G. T.. Jr.
At least no cases have clearly so held and in reviewing the decisions the courts have
never intimated the possibility of any such limitation. See Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328,
329 (1877) ; Rankin v. Fidelity Trust Co., 189 U. S. 242, 246, 23 Sup. Ct. 553, 554 (19o3).
This view is adopted in Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 583, 584.
' Horton v. Mercer, 71 Fed. 153 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895) ; Lewis v. Switz, 74 Fed. 381 (C.
C. D. Neb. 1896).
SWelles v. Larrabee, 36 Fed. 866 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1888).
m Pauly v. State Loan and Trust Co., 165 U. S. 6o6, 17 Sup. Ct. 465 (1897).
Frater v. Old National Bank of Providence, ioi Fed. 391 (C. C. A. Ist, igoo). A
signature as "agent" would apparently relieve the agent of liability. But see Corker v.
Soper, 53 F. (2d) 16o (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) in which other facts nullified effect of signature.
Whitney v. Butler, supra note 48.
Ibid.: Richmond v. Irons. 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887) ; Dellert v. Stallman, 29
F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
'Whitney v. Butler, supra note 48.
es But see interesting comment Note (932) 41 YALE L. J. 583, 591.
' The unfairness of this would be somewhat mitigated if the apparent owner is able to
recover over from the real owner. No cases involving this issue seem to have arisen.
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CONTRACTUAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
STATUTES-An intelligent approach to the problem involved requires a brief expo-
sition of the three prevalent theories I which have been developed to eliminate
the infinite complications arising from the conflict of the various state Compen-
sation Acts.' The prob!em arises simply from the practice, under modern con-
ditions of widespread business enterprise, of sending a company's employees into
foreign states to do work in the course of their employment. It was early felt
that some uniformity of recovery of compensation was imperative in order to
furnish some secure basis upon which the employer might take out insurance
against such claims.3  Resort to common law analogies 4 gave rise to the first two
of the three outstanding conflict of laws doctrines.
The first, originally sponsored by Massachusetts, 5 goes upon the reasoning
that the statute is merely a legislative substitute for the common law rules of tort
liability ' with the result that the statutes have no effect upon injuries inflicted
outside of the jurisdiction of their enactmentT Although this theory has been
criticised,s chiefly upon the theoretical ground that the vicarious nature of liability
under compensation statutes contradicts any consideration of them as delictual,9
enough of the characteristics of tort liability remain to amply justify the analogy.
The second theory arose "I from the other plausible common law analogue,
the contract, and has properly been denominated as quasi ex contractu 11 at the
most. Under this fictitious doctrine,12 the provisions of the statute at the locus
contractus are unceremoniously incorporated into the terms of the contract of
employment 13 in order that the employer may be assured of uniform liability in
any forum.14  Such practical advantages may be questioned in the light of the
'For discussions of these theories, see Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Con-
flict of Laws (1927) ii MINN. L. REv. 329, 332; GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAws (1927)
20I; Note (i93o) 16 VA. L. Rxv. 7O.
'For the fullest discussion of the statutes in the different states, see BRADBURY, WORI-
.M.'S COleVaxsATION LAW (3d ed. 1917), especially at 82 et seq.
'See Note (I93i) 6 Wis. L. REv. 243, 245; Note (193o) 16 VA. L. Rv. 701; BR-AD-
bURY, supra note 2, at 85.
' See authorities supra note 1.
'In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, i0, N. E. 693 (1913). But the Massachusetts Compen-
sation Act in terms has been amended to apply to foreign injuries under a local contract.
Penderzoli's Case, 269 Mass. 550, 169 N. E. 427 (1930).
But the -tort" theory has been followed in other jurisdictions. Union Bridge & Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 287 111. 396, I N. E. 6og (i919) ; Johnson V. Nelson,
128 Minn. 158, 15o N. W. 62o (1915); Schwartz v. India Rubber Works, [1912] 2 K. B.
299.
a'Note I6 VA. L. REV. 701, 702; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 202.
'The expression that "such laws have no extra-territorial effect" is a misnomer when
it is meant that the lex locus delicti should not be applied in a foreign forum. But when
it is meant that, with regard to the local matter of tort liability only the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act in force at the place of injury should control, the conclusion is reasonable.
'BRADBURY, op. cit. supra note I, at 85.
'Note (I93O) 16 VA. L. REv. 7o, 702.
"See Note (930) 16 VA. L. RFv. 701, 703, where it is pointed out that this theory
probably arose as a subterfuge to avoid constitutional difficulty; cf. Ives v. South Buffalo
R. R., 0o1 N. Y. 27I, 94 N. E. 431 (I91).
"Reading into the contract of employment the provisions of the statute, we held that
a liability quasi lex contractic was imposed on the employer. Contractual in a strict sense,
of course, the liability is not . ." Cardozo, J., Smith v. Heine Boiler Co., 224 N. Y.
9, 1i, 119 N. E. 878 (1918).
"See authorities supra note I, and note that the claim for compensation has been held
not to be contractual within the Statute of Limitations. Davidson v. Payne, 281 Fed. 544(D. Kan. 19-'2).
"State Ind. Comm. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263, 42 Sup. Ct. 473 (1922 ) ; Post
v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 1i N. E. 351 (1916); Kennerson v. Thomas Towboat
Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372 (1918) (elective act); State v. District Court, 139 Minn.
2o5, I66 N. W. 185 (1918) (elective act).
"'Supra note 4.
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confusion among the states as to when and whether the law of the place of per-
formance should be applied rather than the law of the place of contracting."
But aside from this, the theoretical objections are obviously numerous, 10 arising
chiefly from a lack of express mutual intent, even under so-called "elective"
statutes,17 and from the fact that a statutory amendment will change the obliga-
tion of the parties without their consent.'
It is probable that the third theory was evolved with a view to accomplishing
the practical result achieved by the contract theory, but without its logical incon-
sistencies. Under this view, the obligation is neither a delictual nor a contractual
one, but is rather a
"statutory regulation of the relation of employer and employee 1' based upon
the theory that the industry should bear the burden of accidents incident to
its operation, and that the fulfillment of this policy requires that the statute
should control whether the injury occurs within or without the state where
the contract of employment was made." 20
This view has the advantage of freedom from the restraints of analogy. But in
spite of this and the overwhelming logical obstacles to the development of the
contractive theory it has prevailed in a majority of jurisdictions," at least in
jurisdictions having elective statutes.
This note does not encompass a discussion of conflicts between different
types of elective and compulsory statutes, and the probably more acute procedural
problems arising out of the locally specialized forms of administrative bodies
authorized by the legislatures to carry out the provisions of compensation acts.22
It is sufficient to note that it is out of this contest of competing analogies and the
theories arising therefrom that the more specific problem involved in the present
discussion arises, i. c., the matter of restraints imposed by the compensation act
at the place of hiring upon the employee's right to sue at common law in a foreign
state.
The cause of action illustrated by the principal case of Bradford Electric Co.
v. Clappe r'3 is simple enough in itself. A Vermont resident's administratrix
'See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 228 et seq. But note that where contract in
state A for performance solely within state B. the lcx loci contractus has been held to
apply. Pettiti v. Pardy Constr. Co., io3 Conn. lo, 13o Atl. 70 (1925) ; Hall v. Ind. Comm.,
77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. io73 (1925) ; Penderzoli's Case, supra note 5.
" See authorities supra note 1, and Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensa-
tion, Acts (1914) 27 HAv. L. RFv. 235, 248-249; Dwan, op. cit. supra note I, at 341; (1923)
37 HARV. L. REv. 375, 376; (1922) 21 MICH. L. REv. 449.
" The failure to give notice under these elective statutes is usually held to raise an
"irrebutable presumption" of assent. American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436,
92 Atl. 85 0I914).
"See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 203, where it is suggested that constitutional
difficulties would arise from an attempt to amend such acts if a strict contract theory should
be adhered to. See Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., I69 Wis. io6, 17o N. W. 275
(919).
" See POUXD, THE SPIRT OF THE Coam.ox L -w, 29-31.
This view has been favored in applications of compulsory compensation acts, BRADBURY,
oap: cit. supra note 2, at 86. but has been adopted chiefly in cases under elective statutes.
Anderson v. Miller, supra note I8 (but notice the language used at 115, "Our act enters
into and becomes a part of every contract").
' GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 204: Moody v. Industrial Accident Comm., 260
Pac. 967 (Cal. 1927); Ocean Accident Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275,
257 Pac. 644 (1927); Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., supra note I8; see Smith v.
Heine Boiler, Co., supra note Ii.
"1 See authorities supra note I.
"GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note I, at 204 et seq.; BRADBURY, Op. cit. su pra note 2, at
95 et seq.
15. F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. ist, 1931). On May x6, 1932. the United States Supreme
Court reversed this decision on the ground that it violated the "full faith and credit" clause.
U. S. Daily, May 18, 1932, at 525.
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brings an action in New Hampshire against a Vermont public utility corporation
for "death by wrongful act" " caused by the defendant's negligence in New
Hampshire, 25 the simple case of a local injury for which the local statutes provide
a remedy. But the problem arises when the defendant electric company interposes
the extraterritorial defense that the Vermont contract and statute ., bar the com-
mon law action for negligence.
The Vermont elective Compensation Act, in order to induce acceptance
thereof by the employer and employee, provides that a failure to assent to its
terms will deprive the employer of his common law defenses and make it neces-
sary for the employee to meet those defenses and prove negligence.2 7  Such
assent, it is provided, will be "irrebuttably presumed" 2s from a failure to give
notice of nonacceptance.2 9 It is obvious that the plaintiff was discarding the
remedy under this act, which would have yielded burial expenses alone, for that
under the New Hampshire Lord Campbell's Act 2 0 which provided recovery for
pain and suffering in addition to the pecuniary loss allowed under the Vermont
Act. New Hampshire had an elective Compensation Act 2 1 which, similarly to
the Vermont Act, provided that such statutory recovery should be exclusive of
all other remedies in case of injury,2 but only the defendant had accepted the
former act and it did not require election by the plaintiff until after injury.3
Plaintiff's action was removed from the state to the federal court and a majority
- Death by Wrongful Act Statutes must be distinguished from survival statutes. In
the case of the latter, the right of action, having been availed of by the injured party dur-
ing his life, is continued by his personal representatives after his death. The right of re-
covery for the death arises from the wrong inflicted upon the deceased and the amount
of recovery is determined from the standpoint of the deceased, being measured by the value
of his life without reference to the interests of the beneficiaries. See the recent case of
Brown v. Perry, 156 Atl. 91O (Vt. 1931).
The Death Statutes, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Acts, create a right of
action upon the death of the deceased which has come to be considered a common law right
of action. Aside from the fact that the right of action arises only after the death of the
injured party, a difference from the former type of statutes in theory, quality and object
is found in the fact that recovery is based upon loss sustained by deceased's beneficiaries
as generally designated by the statute in question rather than upon any loss to deceased's
estate. For further discussion, see Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 993.
It is at once apparent that the right of action for death by wrongful act is delictual
in nature, the creature of the statute at the place where the wrong was inflicted, and hence
recovery should be allowed or denied solely in accordance with the lex loci delictn.
See New Hampshire Death by Wrongful Act Statute, N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c.
302, §§ 9-14.
-' VT. GEa-. LAws (19-o6) c. -41 (typical "elective" statute).
- Ibid.
"As the court of one state has put it, the failure to give such notice creates an irre-
buttable presumption of assent." Principal case, supra note 23, at 994; see comment supra
note 17.
' Supra note 26.
"The plaintiff, however, does not now wish to accept the payment to which he is en-
titled under the compensation plan. He is advised that his injuries were due to the em-
ployer's negligence, and he wishes to take his chances on getting a larger amount through
a suit at law." Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., 87 Misc. 156 at 158, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 1035 at io36.
Supra note 25.
N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) c. 178.
See ibid. § 12.
Ibid. § i1.
It is to be noted that the New Hampshire Act is unique in this regard in that no other
state seems to have expressly so reserved the common law remedy to the injured employee.
See principal case, supra note z3, at 997, where the court accounts for this unusual provi-
sion on the ground that the New Hampshire legislature was exercising unusual caution due
to contemporaneous arguments that such acts were unconstitutional. The case further
points out, at 094, that such elective statutes have never been held invalid on grounds of
unconstitutionality.
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of the latter sustained the defendant's theory. On rehearing, however, the court
reversed itself on the grounds that (i) the defendant's acceptance of the New
Hampshire act bound him to allow the plaintiff's choice of an action at law for
death caused by negligence, and (2) a Vermont contract purporting to release
an employer from liability for future negligence 34 cannot bar an action brought
in New Hampshire for an injury there sustained, "and thus change the public
policy of New Hampshire." s:
That the first ground for the decision of the majority is unsound is clearly
demonstrated in the opinion of the dissenting circuit judge. It is there pointed
out that acceptance of the New Hampshire Act by the company was solely with
a view to protecting itself against suits by its employees under New Hampshire
contracts, without regard to such Vermont employees as it should have occasion
to send into New Hampshire for temporary employment. By rejection of the
Compensation Act and suit under the Lord Campbell's Act, the plaintiff brought
her action just as if no Compensation Act existed. But the dissenting judge adds
that the defenses now available to the defendant, as at common law, include those
that the defendant might have by conflict of laws rules, i. e., the exclusive remedy
under the Vermont Act as a defense at the forum.3
The second ground for the decision appears to be equally without force.
Without the fictitious contract theory the public policy of New Hampshire need
not have been, it seems improperly, referred to, and without either of these incon-
gruous elements, the decision is unquestionably the correct one. Certainly the
application of New Hampshire law to negligent injuries inflicted within its terri-
tory should not be refused by reason of a fiction. It may be assumed that such a
quasi ex contractu doctrine of liability might justify its existence when employed
to prevent recovery on the contract of employment under the compensation statute
at the place of injury. Here it may be said in its favor that it prevents an under-
sirable "shopping" for compensation. Yet the principal case presents a strong
argument against carrying it to its logical extremes. The chief argument in favor
of the contract theory, as indicated above, consists in the fact that wrong need
not be proved under Compensation Acts. But when there is an actual wrong,
as in the principal case, which is local in nature and for which the local law allows
recovery, and when the question of 1,orkmen's Compensation is so utterly foreign
to the case, a stronger case for disregarding the contract fiction could hardly be
devised.
In reversing the decision of the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court held,3
that the Vermont Act is not contrary to the public policy of New Hampshire and
therefore must be given full faith and credit by the courts of New Hampshire.
The view of the dissenting opinion of the Circuit Court that the contract
theory should be employed to bar remedies outside the state of employment finds
some support in the decided cases.as Thus the New York Supreme Court, in
Schweitfer v. Hainburg-Amerikanische,39 held that liability under the German
Workmen's Compensation Act was a bar to recovery at common law for a negli-
gent injury to an employee in New York harbor. Likewise, in Barnhart v. Steel
Co.,40 the Court of Appeals of the same state refused the court's aid to a plaintiff
' See comment on this point in dissenting opinion of Wilson, J., principal case supra
note 23, at 1002.
Supra note 23, at ooo.
'Ibid. at oo.
Supra note 23.
It is to be noted that the majority opinion admits the general applicability of this
theory, although finding grounds for an exception in the instant case.
379 Misc. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944 (i913) ; see Note (932) i8 VA. L. REv. 432, 434
(excellent discussion of the New York cases in regard to the present problem).
*227 N. Y. 531, 325 N. E. 675 (1920). See Anderson v. Standard Oil Co., 124 Misc.
829, 209 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1925); Prdich v. N. Y. Central R. R., iii Misc. 430, 383 N. Y.
Supp. 77 (1920).
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suing under the New York death statute for the wrongful death of a New Jersey
employee caused while he was working in New York. The decision of the court
in the latter case is necessarily tantamount to a holding that the existence of the
New Jersey statute deprived the plaintiff of his common law remedy for a New
York tort.4 ' The court spoke of public policy, and, having concluded that the
New Jersey statute was a part of the contract of employment, specifically held
that such a contract was enforceable in New York. Upon this premise, it can be
seen that a court wishing to uphold tort liability at the place of injury is driven
irresistibly to overcome the effect of the foreign bar to the action by a resort to
public policy." On this latter analysis, a New York court, accustomed to enforc-
ing the New York compulsory Compensation Statute, could not in conscience
object to an elective statute even of the "presumed election" type. If New York
will deny its common law remedy to employees under local contracts, against
their will, then it is a trifling matter to deny such relief to employees of another
state as against a purely public policy objection. But, aside from the matter of
policy, no court appears to have questioned the view taken by the New York
court,43 with the exception of the North Carolina courts.4
It is clear that this new problem in the law created by the universal enact-
ment of compensation statutes may not be solved by means of analogies drawn
from common law rules. The error in the majority contract view arises from
the attempt to mould the legal incidents of the relationship between employer and
employee to fit the conflict of laws rules that will be most conducive to stabilizing
the employer's liability. It may well be asked whether this theory should be
applied to a case where an employer with a nation-wide business is in the practice
of negotiating all his contracts of employment in the state where liability for
compensation is slightest. Could it then be said that an injury in a state where
the compensation act was peculiarly adapted to the local industrial hazards should
not at least be redressed as at common law?
It has been suggested that the remedy lies in uniform legislation,;" or in legis-
lation that by its terms applies to all injuries suffered while within the enacting
state irrespective of where the contract of employment was entered into.4 6  But
' 1This follows from the provision of the New York Lord Campbell's Act that action
thereunder would only lie where the decedent would have had a common law action for
damages had he lived. N. Y. Coxs. LAws (Cahill i93o) c. 13, § 130.
'This appears to have been the situation of the majority of the court in the principal
case., The New York view (see sura notes 39 and 4o) has been adopted by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Spencer Kellogg, 52 F. (2d) 129
(C. C. A. -d, 1931); see The Linseed King, 48 F. (2d) 3IH (S. D. N. Y. 193o). Also
note the decision under the Missouri Compensation Act, in Scott v. White Eagle Oil and
Refining Co., 47 F. (2d) 615 (D. Kan. i93o).
"Farr v. Babcock Lumber Co., 182 N. C. 725, IO9 S. E. 833 (1921) (the court's
reasons for so holding are not fully discussed) ; cf. Johnson v. Carolina Ry., 191 N. C. 75,
131 S. E. 390 (1926) ; (1926) 40 HARv. L. REV. I30; (1926) 21 Ir.. L. REV. 184; Lee v.
Chemical Construction Co., 2oo N. C. 319, i56 S. E. 859 (i931) and see the comment on
this last case in Note (193) I8 VA. L. REV. 432, 436, in which the author comments on
the distinction from the principal case in that North Carolina had enacted its first Com-
pensation Act in 19-9. N. C. PUB. LAWS (1929) c. 120.
'Dwan, op. cit. supra note i, at 352 (where the author points out that some steps
have been taken by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
"The definiteness and clarity of the original Pennsylvania Act has been commended.
Dwan, ibid. "This Act shall . . . apply to all accidents occurring within this Common-
wealth, irrespective of the place where the contract of hiring was made, renewed, or ex-
tended, and shall not apply to any accident occurring outside of the Commonwealth." PA.
STAT. (West, 1920) §21916, P. L. 736, art. I, § r. But cf. Amendment of April 29,
i29, P. L. 853, ". • • except accidents occurring to Pennsylvania employees whose duties
require them to go temporarily beyond the territorial limits of the Commonwealth, not
over ninety days, when such employees are performing services for employers whose place
of business is within the Commonwealth."
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where the act provides recovery for injuries to local employees while engaged in
the employer's business outside the state, 7 the application of the act to injuries
outside the state should not be exclusive.
It may be conceded that the mere enforcement at the forum of a foreign
act that conflicts with local laws does not give extraterritorial effect to that act.
Yet if the foreign act is applied to a local matter which is completely covered as
such by a local law, then certainly the subversion of the local laws to such foreign
act is strictly an extraterritorial extension of the provisions of the foreign law
that should find no justification in conflict of laws theories.
A.F.B.
"See, for example, the Pennsylvania Act. ibid.
